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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNIST YOUTH RALLY, BERLIN, 27-29 MAY 50 (SUMMARY)

The views set forth in CIA Intelligence Memorandum dated 3 March 50, subject: Probable Effect of the May Youth Rally in Berlin, are believed to remain generally valid. Subsequent developments, however, have emphasized the probability that the Free German Youth (FDJ) rally in Berlin 27-29 May 50 will be used by the USSR more for propaganda and psychological harassment of the western sectors than as a direct attempt to seize the entire city. The rally is thus likely to be, not a conclusive action, but rather an episode in a continuing attempt of the USSR to reduce the resistance of West Berliners to Communist intimidation, to damage the west sector economy by traffic restrictions, and to alienate western Berliners from the western powers. The basic aim in these Soviet tactics is the eventual ejection of the western powers from the city.

The possibility remains, however, that localized "spontaneous incidents" in connection with the rally will get out of hand and develop into riot proportions. Efforts will probably be made by the FDJ to stage isolated demonstrations in the western sectors of Berlin, possibly by the use of trained "agitation units". Tactics of this sort may lead to conflict with the west sector police or with western-power military units. Such "spontaneous"

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violence would not directly involve the USSR, but would serve the USSR as a probing operation to test western reaction to East German aggressive action and would provide the East German cause with youthful martyrs.

The west sector security forces are believed adequate to suppress such disturbances as may arise from the rally. The immediate effect on the morale of West Berliners will probably be favorable, though a subsequent let down of morals, comparable to that which followed the Berlin Blockade, seems

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The views set forth in CTA Intelligence Memorandum No. 277 dated 2 Memora

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNIST YOUTH RALLY, HERLAN 27-29 MAY 50

The views set forth in CIA Intelligence Memorandum No 275 dated 3 March 50, subject: Probable Effect of the May Youth Rally in Berlin, are believed to remain generally valid. Subsequent developments, however, have emphasized the probability that the Free German Youth (FDJ) rally in Berlin 27-29 May 50, will be used by the USSR more for propaganda and psychological harassment of the western sectors than as a direct attempt to seize the entire city.

The USSR probably considers that a GDR effort to seize and hold Berlin would be impossible without direct Soviet troop assistance. As such action on the part of the USSR would involve great risk of war, it is not believed that the USSR will employ troops in West Berlin on this occasion.

an episode in a continuing campaign of propaganda and economic pressure against Berlin. The specific aim of this campaign is the alienation of west Berliners from the western powers and the eventual ejection of those powers from the city. To this end, in conjunction with the FDJ rally, the USSR will continue to employ transportation restrictions to damage the west sector economy and will attempt to link West Berlin industry with that of the Soviet Zone. By propaganda and political measures, the USSR will try to Portrain
Berlin as the capitol of the East German Democratic Republic. The USSR will try by all practicable means to emphasize the isolation of the western sectors

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of Berlin within the Soviet Zone and to weaken the resistance of West Berliners to Communist intimidation. Further "peace" demonstrations in Berlin are

Although the FDJ rally is primarily a propaganda maneuver, the possibility remains that localized "spontaneous" incidents in connection with the rally will get out of hand and develop into riot proportions. Efforts will probably be made by the FDJ to stage isolated demonstrations in the western sectors, possibly by the use of "agitation units" trained for the purpose. Tactics of this sort may lead to conflict with the west sector police or western military units. Such tactics would not directly involve the USSE, but would serve the USSE as a probing operation to test western reaction to East German aggressive action and would provide the East German cause with youthful Communist martyrs.

The FDJ will probably be able to assemble in Berlin approximately 500,000 Communist-indoctrinated East German youth for the demonstration. About 10,000 members of the East German paramilitary police (Alert Police) are scheduled to participate in the rally. They will probably attend unarmed. Delegations of the regular police will also probably attend. There is no reliable evidence, however, that any of these police have as yet received orders to join in any violence arising from the rally. Their participation is likely to be orderly and well disciplined.

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The possibility exists, as demonstrated during the recent May Day demonstrations, that the West Berliners themselves will accept any challenges and may offer provocation to ricting. The strong reaction of the West Berlin population to the May Day threat indicates that they will enthusiastically support the western powers.

Although 28 May has been journalistically featured as the date of probable disturbances, such incidents may well occur at any time of the rally, and the possibility will not end at the termination of the rally. A mass invasion of the western sectors is unlikely. Should such an invasion develop, it would probably be in an attempt of the FDJ to organize a parade in the western sectors.

The Communist will attempt to exploit the FDJ rally as a program for Sovietinspired "peace" propaganda, attacking the US and other western powers for using Germany as a base for war against the Soviet Union, while friendship for the USSR will be proclaimed as the only road to peace. FDJ propaganda will, moreover, highlight present uncertainties in West Berlin with respect to unemployment and economic prospects.

The FDJ rally will probably be most immediately successful as a demonstration of Communist success in the political indoctrination of German youth. Its sports program and militant nature will appeal to German youth. Its similarity to Nazi mass demonstrations, however, will react adversely on older Germans. Reiteration of the Western Allied will to remain in Berlin has gone a long way

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has kept some vestiges of hope alive among East Germans. The Communist retreat from earlier militant propaganda that the rally would "take over" West Berlin has also weakened the Communist propaganda position. Assuming that the western security forces are able to control any manifestations of violence during the rally, as seems probable, the immediate effect of the rally on the morale of West Berliners is likely to be favorable. A subsequent let-down of morale is possible, however, comparable to that which followed the Berlin Blockade.